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After one makes a decision, it is common to reflect not 
only on the outcome that was achieved but also on 
what might have been. For example, one might con-
sider whether going to a party would have been more 
fun than staying home to work on a manuscript. These 
counterfactual comparisons can have negative emo-
tional consequences; they can lead to the experience 
of regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). In the current study, 
we examined a commonly observed yet understudied 
aspect of counterfactual comparisons: the motivational 
lure of counterfactual information—counterfactual 
curiosity (FitzGibbon, Moll, Carboni, Lee, & Dehghani, 
2019). Specifically, we found that people are so strongly 
seduced to know counterfactual information that they 
are willing to incur costs for information about how 
much they could have won, even if the information is 
likely to trigger negative emotions (regret) and is non-
instrumental to obtaining rewards.
People frequently contemplate counterfactual alterna-
tives to reality by mentally simulating possible alternative 
outcomes to past events. However, there are also occa-
sions when these counterfactual considerations can be 
verified by seeking out the true outcome of previously 
rejected choice alternatives. For example, when shop-
ping, after choosing a line at the checkout, we may find 
it irresistible to monitor the progress of another shopper 
in the adjacent line. In this way, we seek information 
about what would have happened had we made a dif-
ferent choice. Information seeking about counterfactual 
alternatives has been studied in human adults (Shani, 
Tykocinski, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Shani & Zeelenberg, 
2007; Summerville, 2011; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007), 
children (FitzGibbon et al., 2019), and rhesus macaques 
(Wang & Hayden, 2019).
Although counterfactual information can sometimes 
have instrumental value (Boorman, Behrens, & Rushworth, 
2011), there are also examples of people simply want-
ing the counterfactual information for its own sake. 
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Abstract
After you make a decision, it is sometimes possible to seek information about how things would be if you had 
acted otherwise. We investigated the lure of this counterfactual information, namely, counterfactual curiosity. In a 
set of five experiments (total N = 150 adults), we used an adapted Balloon Analogue Risk Task with varying costs of 
information. At a cost, people were willing to seek information about how much they could have won, even though it 
had little utility and a negative emotional impact (i.e., it led to regret). We explored the downstream effects of seeking 
information on emotion, behavior adjustment, and ongoing performance, showing that it has little or even negative 
performance benefit. We also replicated the findings with a large-sample (N = 361 adults) preregistered experiment 
that excluded possible alternative explanations. This suggests that information about counterfactual alternatives has a 
strong motivational lure—people simply cannot help seeking it.
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Noninstrumental information seeking may be thought 
of as an expression of curiosity or a more general desire 
to resolve uncertainty (Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018). Coun-
terfactual curiosity can be observed when the sought 
information cannot lead to better decision-making in 
the future, such as when outcomes are randomly gener-
ated in a gambling task. In the information-seeking 
literature, noninstrumental seeking behavior has been 
empirically demonstrated in a variety of ways. For 
example, people will incur small costs to receive infor-
mation about upcoming rewards even though that infor-
mation cannot be used to modify those rewards or 
improve decision-making (Bennett, Bode, Brydevall, 
Warren, & Murawski, 2016). Humans also sometimes 
feel a compulsion for potentially negative information. 
For example, people choose to expose themselves to 
various kinds of negative stimuli, including images 
depicting violence and physical harm (Oosterwijk, 
2017) and the details of partners’ infidelity (Kruger & 
Evans, 2009). These kinds of behaviors are difficult to 
explain from traditional economic and decision-making 
theories and suggest that information itself may hold 
some strong motivational value, prompting organisms 
to approach the information without the reflection of 
its potential benefit and risk (FitzGibbon, Lau, & 
Murayama, 2020; Litman, 2005).
Despite the increasing number of empirical studies 
investigating the lure of curiosity, counterfactual curios-
ity has received little attention. In the literature of coun-
terfactual comparisons, researchers have found effects 
of counterfactual comparisons in many areas of cogni-
tion, including reasoning (Smallman & Summerville, 
2018), reward learning (Boorman et  al., 2011), and 
moral judgment (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 
2008). However, in most of these studies, forgone infor-
mation is either provided to or imagined by participants, 
so they cannot address the underlying motivation that 
prompts people to seek counterfactual information.
Only a limited number of studies have demonstrated 
that human adults will choose to seek noninstrumental 
information about forgone alternatives (Shani et  al., 
2008; Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007; Summerville, 2011; van 
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007). For example, Shani and 
Zeelenberg (2007, Experiment 4) asked participants 
whether they would check the numbers on a lottery 
ticket that they forgot to submit to see if they would 
have won the jackpot and found that participants 
reported that they would check. However, most of these 
studies relied on a scenario design, in which partici-
pants imagined having made the decision and then 
reported whether they would seek information about 
the alternative outcomes (Shani et al., 2008; Shani & 
Zeelenberg, 2007; Summerville, 2011, Experiments 2, 
3, and 4). In addition, in all of the studies, participants 
were able to choose to see the forgone option without 
incurring costs. In such situations, information seeking 
about the alternative outcomes cannot inform us about 
the strong motivational value of forgone options and 
may even reflect participants’ random responding.
In the set of experiments presented in this article, 
we addressed the motivational lure of counterfactual 
curiosity by exploring people’s willingness to seek 
information about what they could have won in a modi-
fied Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 
2002) when the information came free of cost (Experi-
ment 1) as well as when participants had to incur a 
cost, such as money (Experiment 2), physical effort 
(Experiments 3 and 4), and time (Experiment 5). On 
each trial (see Fig. 1), participants pumped up a balloon 
to earn points and tried to avoid bursting the balloon 
by going beyond its randomly assigned safe limit. After 
seeing the trial’s outcome (“bank” or “bust”), partici-
pants were given the opportunity to seek information 
about the balloon’s limit to learn how much they could 
have won on that trial (see Fig. 1).
This task provides an ideal experimental setting to 
examine the motivational lure of counterfactual curios-
ity because (a) the balloon’s limit changes randomly 
across trials, meaning that postoutcome information 
about the balloon’s limit has little instrumental value in 
principle, and (b) after a bank outcome, participants 
were almost guaranteed to learn bad news (i.e., “I could 
have won more”) given that there was only a small 
Statement of Relevance 
Why is it that people want to know what might have 
been? This phenomenon of counterfactual curiosity 
is commonly observed, yet understudied. In this 
research, we conducted a set of experiments to test 
people’s motivation to find out how things could 
have turned out but did not. Using a simulated 
gambling situation, we found that people will 
actually incur costs to gain information about what 
they could have won, even though that information 
could not change the outcomes of the current 
or future gambles. They seek this information 
in spite of the possibility that it will make them 
feel bad about their choices. This research shows 
that information about what might have been has 
motivational salience—people are motivated simply 
to have the information. Motivational salience 
might also help to explain the fear-of-missing-out 
(FOMO) phenomenon. It seems that we just cannot 
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chance that participants pumped the balloon just the 
right amount. This information is likely to lead to 
regret—a negative emotion focused on one’s own past 
action. Regret results from the comparison of an 
obtained outcome with a better outcome that would 
have been achieved if one had acted differently (Camille 
et al., 2004). By taking advantage of such features of 
the experimental task, we examined whether partici-
pants were willing to incur a cost to seek information 
about how much they could have won if they had 
pumped the balloon further. This information bore little 
instrumental utility and was likely to have a negative 
impact on their emotions (i.e., regret). We also explored 
further implications of the lure of counterfactual curios-
ity by investigating the downstream effects of seeking 
information about missed opportunities—whether peo-
ple used the counterfactual information to adjust their 
behavior even if the information was almost noninstru-
mental. Because regret also has a strong motivational 
function to bias people’s decision-making behavior 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008), it is possible that information-
seeking behavior in the current task ultimately led to 
increased risk taking (Büchel, Brassen, Yacubian, 
Kalisch, & Sommer, 2011). Thus, counterfactual curios-
ity may make people expose themselves to information 
that not only makes them feel bad but also will lead 
them to take further risks. We examined this possibility 
in an additional exploratory analysis.
Main Study
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty participants (100 female) 
were recruited for five experiments (30 participants for 
each). Table 1 contains sample characteristics and exper-
imental manipulations for each experiment. Participants 
were recruited through either the Sona Systems (https://
sona-systems.com) panel at the University of Reading or 
Prolific (https://prolific.co). Participants recruited through 
Sona Systems received course credit in return for their par-
ticipation; participants recruited using Prolific were paid 
£2.50 for approximately 30 min of study participation plus 
a bonus of up to £1.50 dependent on task performance. 
The sample sizes were predetermined. On the basis of the 
work by Arend and Schäfer (2019), we determined that 
our total sample size (and the number of trials described 
below) would be sufficient (i.e., statistical power > 80%) 
to detect a small effect (i.e., β = 0.1) of trial-level predic-
tors, which was the main focus of our analyses. Note that 
we were not primarily interested in the results of indi-
vidual experiments or the effects of the different cost 
manipulations; we were interested in decision-making 
behavior that is not dependent on experimental context 
or the way we conceptualize cost. Thus, we conducted 
different experiments with slightly different procedures 
and integrated the results to make a stronger case for the 
generalizability of our findings (Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 
2015). For interested readers, however, results from indi-
vidual experiments are available in Figures S5 to S8 in the 
Supplemental Material available online, and we also 
report an index (I2) that quantified the overall differences 
among the experiments (see the Data Analysis section). 
No participants were excluded from the analysis. All pro-
cedures were approved by the University of Reading’s 
School Research Ethics Committee (SREC; 2016-109-KM).
Procedure. In all five experiments, participants com-
pleted two practice trials and 60 test trials of the BART 
with advance bidding. The five experiments had a very 
similar trial structure, and differences among experiments 
are described after the main procedure. An example trial 
sequence from Experiment 1 can be seen in Figure 1. 
Links to the experimental materials are available on OSF 
(https://osf.io/mtsqv/).
In the BART, participants inflated a balloon and 
earned points in proportion to the number of pumps 
they made. Importantly, each balloon had a randomly 
selected “safe limit”; if the balloon was pumped beyond 
this limit, then it would explode, and no points would 
be earned. On each trial, the participants were first 
shown the number of points that each pump was worth 
(pump value; this was randomly selected on each trial 
from a uniform distribution of 1–100). They then chose 





site Sample size Mean age (years)
Age range 
(years)
Exp. 1 No cost No Sona N = 30 (28 women) 19.90 (SD = 1.70) 18–26
Exp. 2 Money Yes Prolific N = 30 (15 women) 34.62 (SD = 11.37) 20–68
Exp. 3 Physical effort No Sona N = 30 (27 women) 19.61 (SD = 1.07) 18–22
Exp. 4 Physical effort Yes Prolific N = 30 (15 women) 36.03 (SD = 13.50) 18–69
Exp. 5 Time (5 s) Yes Prolific N = 30 (15 women) 38.27 (SD = 12.63) 18–62
Note: Sona refers to the undergraduate-student research-participation panel at the University of Reading. Prolific.co is an online participant-
recruitment site.
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how many times to pump a balloon (number of pumps; 
between 1 and 12 pumps), which was followed by an 
animation showing a cartoon rabbit pressing a pump 
to inflate the balloon the number of times the partici-
pant chose (irrespective of the outcome). With each 
pump, the balloon was enlarged, and the number of 
points was displayed and updated. Then the outcome 
was revealed: The balloon either remained intact (out-
come = bank) or burst (outcome = bust), signifying 
whether or not they had pumped the balloon beyond 
its safe limit. The safe limit was randomly selected on 
each trial from a uniform distribution between 0 (the 
balloon would burst after one pump) and 12 (the bal-
loon would not burst after 12 pumps). Participants were 
explicitly informed in the instructions that the safe limit 
was determined randomly on every trial. When the 
outcome was revealed, the rabbit was depicted holding 
a bag that showed the points banked on the trial: the 
pump value multiplied by the number of pumps made 
on a bank trial and 0 points on a bust trial.
When the outcome was displayed, a visual analogue 
scale with pictures of a sad face on the left and a happy 
face on the right appeared below the rabbit and the 
balloon. Participants were asked to rate how they felt 
by dragging the marker along the scale. This rating, 
scored between −200 and 200, is referred to as the 
outcome rating. Participants were then given the oppor-
tunity to see the balloon’s safe limit (i.e., how far they 
could have pumped the balloon safely in that trial). If 
they chose to do so, the balloon’s safe limit was shown 
for 4,000 ms. This was depicted as a horizontal red line 
in the balloon area showing where the balloon could 
have been safely pumped to and the total point value 
associated with that limit (i.e., how much they could 
have won). If they chose not to view the balloon’s safe 
limit, participants still waited 4,000 ms before making 
the second rating (this was done to equate the time to 
the following emotion-change rating between when 
participants chose to see the limit and when they did 
not). After the 4,000 ms had elapsed, participants rated 
how their emotional state had changed on a visual 
analogue scale with the left anchor as “worse” and the 
right anchor as “better.” This rating, also scored between 
−200 and 200, is referred to as the emotion-change rat-
ing. The trial ended when this rating was submitted. 
The purpose of asking participants to rate how their 
emotions had changed was to allow the second rating to 
capture the full range of change even after maximally 
positive or negative emotion ratings after seeing the out-
come (for a similar procedure, see O’Connor, McCormack, 
& Feeney, 2012). This measurement is aligned with a 
common definition of regret in the literature as a nega-
tive emotion experienced after learning that one 
could have had a better outcome if one had acted 
differently (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986). We did not directly ask 
participants to rate their regret directly because this 
assessment may potentially bias ratings by eliciting 
demand char ac teristics.
To ensure the generalizability of the findings, we 
varied the cost of receiving information about the bal-
loon’s safe limit and the conversion of earned points 
into a monetary bonus across the five experiments (see 
Table 1). In Experiment 1, there was no cost; in Experi-
ment 2, participants paid 5 points to learn the balloon’s 
outcome; in Experiments 3 and 4, participants put in 
physical effort by making as many key presses as they 
could in a 4-s period; and in Experiment 5, participants 
incurred a 5-s time penalty after the trial. In Experi-
ments 1, 2, and 5, if participants chose to view the 
balloon’s limit, then it was always shown to them. In 
contrast, in Experiments 3 and 4, there was a threshold 
of effort determined by an initial calibration phase and 
jittered randomly on each trial. If participants exceeded 
this threshold, then they were shown the balloon’s safe 
limit as described above. If they did not exceed the 
threshold (12% and 8% of trials in Experiments 3 and 
4, respectively), then the words “try harder” were dis-
played for 4,000 ms before they made their second 
emotion rating. These try-harder trials were excluded 
from the analyses predicting the emotion-change rating 
because participants did not receive the information 
(try-harder trials were included in the analyses predict-
ing information seeking reported in the Supplemental 
Material). In Experiments 2, 4, and 5, participants 
received a monetary bonus payment based on the 
points they earned in the task.
Data analysis. As noted earlier, we were interested in 
effects that are generalizable across different cost manip-
ulations. Thus, we report the integrated results of the five 
experiments using a meta-analytic approach. We report 
all the experiments conducted to avoid publication bias, 
and our decision to conduct the five experiments was 
motivated to cover all of the potential cost manipulations 
(Ueno, Fastrich, & Murayama, 2016). We also report I 2 to 
indicate the heterogeneity of the effects across experi-
ments; I 2 greater than 50% indicates substantial heteroge-
neity (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). 
All analyses were conducted in the R programming envi-
ronment (R Core Team, 2020). Further information about 
the packages used can be found in Table S1 in the Sup-
plemental Material.
Our experimental design allowed us to analyze both 
bank and bust trials. The main analyses focused on 
bank trials. This is because bank trials gave us an opti-
mal setting to test our primary research question—
whether participants seek information that is likely to 
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lead to negative emotional experiences (regret; see 
Büchel et al., 2011). On bank trials, information about 
the balloon’s limit primarily signals missed opportunities—
how much more the participant could have won on 
each trial. As a result, information was expected to 
make participants feel worse because it was likely that 
they would learn that they could have won more rather 
than being “just right.” Bank trials are the primary focus 
of analyses in which similar tasks are used in the litera-
ture of regret (Brassen, Gamer, Peters, Gluth, & Büchel, 
2012; Büchel et al., 2011). In contrast, on bust trials, it 
was expected that participants would experience regret 
only when they were very close to the balloon’s limit 
(a near miss; see Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 
2009). In the majority of the bust trials, on the other 
hand, they learned that they would not have won even 
if they pumped slightly fewer times; thus, we did not 
expect them to feel bad but, rather, to feel neutral or 
even a sense of relief that they probably would have 
gone bust anyway. Thus, our main analyses focused on 
bank trials. However, for the purpose of completeness, 
we followed the exact same analysis pipeline with bust 
trials, and the results are briefly reported later (full 
results are presented in the Supplemental Material).
For each experiment, we first examined the fre-
quency of information-seeking behavior after bank tri-
als. Then, to examine the emotional effects of 
information-seeking behavior, we built models predict-
ing emotion-change ratings from information seeking 
using mixed-effects models with the lme4 package 
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Mixed-effects 
models allowed us to examine trial-level associations 
of the variable after taking into account the data depen-
dency due to the nested structure of the data (trials 
were nested within participants). The model includes 
not only information-seeking behavior as the main 
independent variable but also other trial-level control-
ling variables (i.e., the point value of each pump [pump 
value] and the difference between the number of pumps 
made and the balloon’s limit [missed opportunity]) as 
well as their interactions with the information-seeking 
behavior. We first tested the model only with the main 
effects of information seeking and the controlling vari-
ables (Step 1) and then included their interactions with 
information seeking (Step 2). Emotion-change ratings 
were standardized (at the sample level; i.e., across par-
ticipants and trials) before the analysis. Information 
seeking was effect coded (–1 = information not sought, 
1 = information sought). The magnitude of the missed 
opportunity was kept in its original scale and mean 
centered within participants. The pump value was stan-
dardized at the sample level and then mean centered 
within participants. We specified all of the random 
slopes as well as random intercepts to appropriately 
control for Type I error rates. To aid model conver-
gence, we reduced model complexity by forcing the 
correlation parameters of the random effects to zero 
(Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth, Baayen, & Bates, 2017). 
Some models nonetheless resulted in singular model 
fits (i.e., some of the random-effects variances were 
estimated as 0). We report the maximally specified mod-
els, described above, to maintain consistency across 
models. However, we also confirmed that the reported 
results are robust to the removal of random slopes 
terms to allow nonsingular fit from all the models.
Note that the number of pumps that participants 
made can be another controlling variable in our analy-
ses, but this information is partly reflected in missed 
opportunities and thus suffers from the issue of multi-
collinearity. Therefore, this variable was not included 
in this analysis and the following path modeling 
(described below). However, to check the robustness 
of our findings, we repeated the analyses after replacing 
missed opportunities with number of pumps and con-
firmed that all of the main statistically significant results 
remained unchanged.
To determine the downstream effects of information 
seeking, we also conducted a multilevel path analysis. 
This model built on the previous analysis but added 
behavior adjustment and task performance on trial t + 
1 as distal outcomes. More specifically, this model had 
emotion-change ratings on trial t and behavior adjust-
ment on trial t + 1 as mediators between information 
seeking on trial t and performance on trial t + 1 (there 
were two outcomes: the outcome [bank or bust] and 
the number of points won). Like the previous analysis, 
this analysis included the pump value and magnitude 
of the missed opportunity on trial t as control variables 
along with their interactions with information seeking. 
Data from each experiment were analyzed with the 
lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), with the nested struc-
ture of the data (trials nested within participants) being 
accounted for by calculating cluster-robust standard 
errors using lavaan.survey (Oberski, 2014). We also 
computed model fit, which indicates the appropriate-
ness of the paths that we omitted from the model (e.g., 
a direct path from information seeking to behavior adjust-
ment). Our model showed good fit to the data in most 
cases (average comparative fit index = 1.00, range = 
.98–1.00; average Tucker-Lewis index = 0.96, range = 
0.89–1.02; and average root mean square error of approxi-
mation = .037, range = .000–.074), but we also report the 
parameter estimates from the saturated model (i.e., a 
model that estimated all the direct paths as well as medi-
ation paths) in Tables S6 and S8 in the Supplemental 
Material. The unstandardized parameter estimates from 
these models (i.e., betas and standard errors) were then 
submitted to random-effects meta-analyses using the 
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metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010) to integrate indi-
vidual model coefficients from the five experiments.
All data are available on OSF at https://osf.io/mtsqv/.
Results
Frequency of information-seeking behavior. Descrip-
tive statistics of the task performance in each of the five 
experiments can be found in Table 2. Participants were 
fairly conservative across the five experiments, pumping 
the balloon an average of 4.97 times out of 12. The optimal 
strategy for maximizing points would be to pump 6 or 7 
times on every trial (Lejuez et al., 2002), but participants 
did not seem to be aware of that strategy. This conservative 
performance led to more bank than bust trials (M = 62%, 
SE = 6%). Importantly, overall, across the five experiments, 
participants sought information on nearly half of these 
bank trials (M = 46%, SE = 9%). The meta-analysis of the 
mean proportion of trials on which information was sought 
revealed significant heterogeneity between the experi-
ments (I2 = 89%). Observing the proportion of information 
seeking across the five experiments reveals that informa-
tion seeking was highest (M = 67%, SE = 7%) in Experiment 
1 when it incurred no cost and was lowest (M = 18%, SE = 
5%) in Experiment 2 when it incurred a monetary cost. 
Despite the heterogeneity, the probability of information 
seeking was significantly different from zero across all five 
experiments (all ps < .001). Investigation of the trial-level 
factors that predicted information seeking can be found in 
the Supplemental Material.
Emotional experience. To examine whether seeking 
information after bank trials would generally lead partici-
pants to feel worse, we conducted mixed-effects model-
ing predicting participants’ emotion-change ratings from 
information seeking (–1 = information not sought, 1 = 
information sought), pump value, and missed opportu-
nity (i.e., the difference between the number of pumps 
and the balloon’s limit; see Table 3, Step 1). Confirming 
our expectation, results showed that participants felt sig-
nificantly worse after receiving information about the 
balloon’s limit than after rejecting that information 
(b = −0.163, z = −6.71, p < .001, 95% confidence interval, 
or CI = [−0.211, −0.115]; for average emotion-change rat-
ings for each participant in each experiment after seeking 
and not seeking information, see Fig. 2a). This suggests 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Task Performance for the Five Experiments 






of trials with 
bank outcome
Mean proportion of 
information seeking 
after bank outcome
Exp. 1 5.11 (0.23) .60 (.02) .67 (.07)
Exp. 2 5.09 (0.21) .60 (.02) .18 (.05)
Exp. 3 4.88 (0.18) .64 (.02) .56 (.06)
Exp. 4 4.86 (0.23) .62 (.02) .46 (.08)
Exp. 5 4.95 (0.24) .62 (.02) .44 (.08)
 Integrated results 4.97 (0.09) .62 (.01) .46 (.09)
 Heterogeneity (I 2) 0% 3% 89%a
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
aThis value indicates significant heterogeneity among experiments at an alpha of .05.
Table 3. Integrated Results in Models Predicting Emotion-Change Ratings From Information Seeking, Pump Value, and 
Missed Opportunity Across the Five Experiments in the Main Study
Model
Step 1: main effects Step 2: main effects and interactions
b SE z p I 2 b SE z p I 2
Information seeking −0.163 0.024 −6.71 < .001 0% −0.173 0.025 −6.83 < .001 0%
Pump value 0.015 0.031 0.49 .625 51% 0.000 0.020 0.00 .998 0%
Missed opportunity −0.142 0.023 −6.04 < .001 78% −0.163 0.008 −21.04 < .001 14%
Information Seeking × 
Pump Value
−0.125 0.020 −6.08 < .001 0%
Information Seeking × 
Missed Opportunity
−0.144 0.012 −11.71 < .001 68%
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that participants experienced regret when they learned 
how far they could have pumped the balloon. The effect 
had little heterogeneity across experiments (I 2 = 0%), 
indicating the generalizability of the findings regardless 
of the cost manipulation. There was no significant main 
effect of the pump’s value, but there was a negative main 
effect of the missed opportunity (see Table 3, Step 1).
Why did participants feel worse after seeing the 
information? To examine the potential mechanism, we 
added the interaction terms with information seeking 
to the model (see Table 3, Step 2). The main effect of 
information seeking remained significant (b = −0.173, 
z = −6.83, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.222, −0.123], I 2 = 0%). 
Importantly, the analysis showed that this main effect 
was qualified by a negative interaction with missed 
opportunity (see Fig. 2b; b = −0.144, z = −11.71, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [−0.168, −0.120], I 2 = 68%). The magni-
tude of the effect showed heterogeneity across the 
experiments, but a significant negative interaction was 
observed across all experiments (all ps < .001; see Fig. 
2b). Simple-slopes analyses suggest that when partici-
pants sought information, there was a large and signifi-
cant effect of missed opportunity: the larger the missed 
opportunity, the worse they felt (b = −0.308, z = −16.35, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.345, −0.271], I 2 = 73%). These 
results indicate that the negative experience after 
information seeking was driven by the sense of missed 
opportunity—findings consistent with the literature on 
regret (e.g., Brassen et al., 2012). Participants felt posi-
tive when they were “just right” (see Fig. 2b), and there 
is a possibility that participants were motivated to seek 
information to have those positive experiences. How-
ever, the magnitude of positive emotion is small com-
pared with that of the overall negative emotional 
experiences. In addition, exploratory analysis (see the 
Supplemental Material) showed that this positive emo-
tion did not increase participants’ likelihood of seeking 
information on the next trial, suggesting that positive 
emotional experiences did not work as an incentive for 
information-seeking behavior in the next trial. In con-
trast to when participants sought information, when 
they did not seek information, there was a much 
smaller, yet still statistically significant, negative associa-
tion between missed opportunity and emotion-change 
ratings (b = −0.012, z = −2.86, p = .004, 95% CI = 
[−0.021, −0.004], I 2 = 18%). The smaller effect is not 
surprising because participants were unable to per-
ceive missed opportunities when information was not 
sought. The significant relationship even when informa-
tion was not sought may be due to the negative rela-
tionship between the number of pumps and the size of 
the missed opportunity—when participants made more 













































Fig. 2. Effects of information on emotion-change ratings. In the raincloud plot (a), each column of small dots represents data from one experi-
ment. Each small dot represents a participant’s mean emotion-change rating on trials in which they did (blue) and did not (red) seek informa-
tion. The larger dots represent the means for the whole sample; error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The shaded regions indicate the 
density of the data. The linear effects of missed opportunity on emotion-change ratings (b) are shown for trials on which participants did and 
did not seek information. Thicker lines represent the overall effects; thinner lines represent effects for each of the five experiments. The shaded 
area around the thicker line represents the standard error. Emotion-change ratings were mean centered within participants before plotting.
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There was also a significant negative interaction 
between pump value and information seeking (b = 
−0.125, z = −6.08, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.165, −0.085], 
I 2 = 0%). Simple-slopes analysis suggests that when 
participants did not seek information, the pump value 
positively predicted emotion-change ratings—because 
they won more points (b = 0.125, z = 5.17, p < .001, 
95% CI = [0.077, 0.172], I 2 = 0%). In contrast, when they 
did seek information, the value had a negative effect—
they missed out on more points (b = −0.116, z = −4.37, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.169, −0.064], I 2 = 0%).
Downstream effects of information seeking. To deter-
mine whether seeking information affected participants’ 
downstream behavior and performance, we conducted a 
multilevel path analysis (structural equation model; see 
Fig. 3). We aimed to once again show how information 
seeking affected participants’ emotional state and that 
this has consequences for subsequent behavioral change 
and performance. We modeled a path from information 
seeking via emotion change and behavioral adjustment 
on the next trial (positive value means becoming more 
risky after the current bank trial) to the outcome of the 
next trial (both the probability of a bank outcome and the 
number of points that participants banked). As in the pre-
vious analyses, we controlled for the missed opportunity 
and the pump value as well as the interaction between 
these and information seeking (these control variables are 
not shown in Fig. 3; for all the model parameters, see 
Table S5 in the Supplemental Material).
We once again showed that information seeking had 
a negative effect on emotion-change ratings overall (it 
made participants feel worse; b = −0.191, z = −6.13, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.252, −0.130], I 2 = 0%). Consistent 
with the previous results, this effect was qualified by 
the interactions with the missed opportunity (b = 
−0.656, z = −10.65, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.777, −0.536], 
I 2 = 0%) and pump value (b = −0.137, z = −5.33, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [−0.188, −0.087], I 2 = 0%), but on aver-
age, information seeking made participants feel worse.
The next step of the path was between the emotion-
change rating and the adjustment of the number of 
pumps made on the next trial. The worse participants 
felt, the riskier they became on the next trial (b = 
−0.089, z = −4.86, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.125, −0.053], 
I 2 = 0%). This behavioral adjustment had a negative 
effect on both the probability of a bank outcome (b = 
−0.157, z = −22.69, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.170, −0.143], 
I 2 = 0%) and the number of points banked (b = −0.040, 
z = −2.81, p = .005, 95% CI = [−0.069, −0.012], I 2 = 0%) 
on the next trial. This suggests that participants’ adjust-
ment in response to missed opportunities might have 
backfired on average. Note that all of these critical paths 
showed little heterogeneity across the experiments, 
suggesting the robustness and generalizability of the 
results over the different cost manipulations. We also 
tested the significance of the mediation effect from 
information seeking to the next trial outcome and the 
next trial points and found that mediation effects for 
the outcome were negative and statistically significant 
(b = −0.003, z = −3.42, p = .001, 95% CI = [−0.004, 
−0.001], I 2 = 0%), although the effect size was very 
small. On the other hand, the mediation effect for the 
points banked was negative but did not reach statistical 
significance (b = −0.000, z = −1.43, p = .152, 95% CI = 
[−0.001, 0.000], I 2 = 0%). These results suggest that 
information seeking had negative or little benefit on 
participants’ performance on the next trial.
Supplementary analysis and mathematical model-
ing on the noninstrumentality of the informa-
tion. Our data showed that participants were generally 
conservative in pumping the balloon (mean pumps = 
4.97), and as noted earlier, performance on this task (in 
terms of points won) could be optimized by consistently 
selecting six or seven pumps across the trials (Lejuez et al., 
2002). These facts imply that although we found an overall 
negative linear relationship between behavioral adjust-
ment and obtained points, participants might have slightly 
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Fig. 3. Path model demonstrating the effect of information seeking on emotion-change ratings (positive value means feeling better), behavior 
adjustment, and next-trial performance. Values shown are unstandardized coefficients. Asterisks indicate significant paths ( p < .05). The main 
effects of missed opportunity and pump value, along with their interactions with information seeking, were included as control variables.
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trials. To precisely understand the behavioral consequence 
of information seeking in our task, we pooled the data 
from the five experiments and plotted the potential non-
linear relationship between behavioral adjustment and 
obtained points in the next trial using a generalized addi-
tive model (Hastie & Tibshirani, 2014; see Fig. 4a). As 
expected, when behavioral adjustment was small and 
positive (i.e., being slightly riskier), we observed a small 
performance gain. However, the performance dramati-
cally decreased when positive performance adjustment 
was more than a few pumps, producing an overall nega-
tive relationship between performance adjustment and 
obtained points. The plot suggests that although an inher-
ent feature of our task (i.e., there is an optimal strategy) 
brought some performance benefits after minor behav-
ioral change, such a benefit is minimal and was offset by 
a large loss after bigger behavioral change.
In addition to the empirical investigation, mathemati-
cal simulations were also conducted to objectively 
evaluate whether the current task has an inherent struc-
ture that would benefit people who seek information. 
More specifically, we compared two types of hypotheti-
cal participants—those who always seek information 
(information seekers) and those who observe the out-
come (bank or bust) but always decline to see the 
balloon’s limit (outcome observers). In this modeling, 
information seekers adjust their pumps in the next trial 
in proportion to the difference between the number of 
pumps they made and the balloon’s limit that they have 
seen. For example, when they learned that they could 
have pumped k more, they increased their pumps in 
the next trial by k × αi + e pumps, where αi is a param-
eter that represents the magnitude of adjustment for 
information seekers (0 < αi < 1), and e is response vola-
tility (noise), with e ~ N(0, σ2). On the other hand, 
outcome observers knew whether they won or lost only 
in the last trial, and they adjusted their pumps in the 
next trial in proportion to the difference between the 
number of pumps they made and the minimum or maxi-
mum possible limit of the balloon (i.e., 0 or 12) for bust 
and bank trials, respectively. For example, when they 
pumped 4 times and learned that they banked, they 
increased their pumps in the next trial by 8 × αo + e 
pumps, where αo is a parameter that represents the 
magnitude of adjustment for outcome observers (0 < 
αo < 1). We randomly generated these parameter values 
in these models and compared their performance with 
that of a hypothetical baseline model in which partici-
pants do not make use of any feedback information to 
determine the number of pumps (i.e., Gaussian ran-
dom-walk model). We simulated 10,000 of each type 
of hypothetical participant (with 60 trials each) with 
four different levels of response volatility, σ2 = {02, 12, 
22, 32}. We then computed the maximum point gain for 
each type of hypothetical participant, which represents 















































Fig. 4. Detailed analysis and simulation of the potential instrumentality of information in the current task. The smoothed relationship 
between behavior adjustment and subsequent points banked on the next trial (a) is shown across all five experiments. The gray area around 
the line represents the standard error. The results of mathematical simulations comparing adjustments based on the outcome of the trial 
alone or the missed opportunity are shown in (b). The graph shows the maximum point gain of two types of participant as a function of 
the magnitude of response volatility. After the outcome is revealed, participants always either seek information about the balloon’s limit 
(information seekers) or decline to see the balloon’s limit (outcome observers).
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these strategies (i.e., information seeking or outcome 
observation) across the parameter space of αi and αo 
in comparison with the baseline model.
Figure 4b shows the maximum point gain of these 
two types of participant as a function of the magnitude 
of response volatility (for the optimal αi or αo value 
that maximizes task performance, see Table S4 in the 
Supplemental Material). Note that the maximum point 
gain is the average point benefit per trial, and for one 
trial, participants could receive between 0 and 12 
points. As can be seen from the figure, information 
seekers benefit little more than outcome observers, 
indicating that adjusting pumps on the basis of informa-
tion about the balloon’s limit provides little utility to 
maximize their performance in the current task, in com-
parison with just adjusting their pumps on the basis of 
the outcome (i.e., bank or bust) information (the ben-
efit of information seeking over observing the outcome 
on maximum point gain was between 0.014 and −0.086). 
These results demonstrate the noninstrumentality of the 
information in the current task.
Analyses with bust trials. As noted earlier, with the 
current task structure, bank trials provide us with the best 
situation to test the seductive lure of counterfactual infor-
mation because participants are more likely to experi-
ence regret after bank than bust trials. However, for the 
purpose of completeness, we repeated the same set of 
analyses with bust trials (full reports are available in the 
Supplemental Material). On average, participants sought 
information slightly less frequently in bust trials than 
bank trials (M = 43%, SE = 8%). As we expected, the 
effect of information seeking on emotion change was 
weaker or even nonsignificant (e.g., b = −0.066, z = −1.31, 
p = .190, 95% CI = [−0.164, 0.033]) when all the covariates 
and their interactions were included in mixed-effects 
modeling. On the other hand, all other effects were well 
replicated, including those in the path model. Similar to 
the pattern observed in bank trials, the relationship 
between the missed-opportunity and emotion-change 
ratings after information seeking was negative (b = 
−0.120, z = −2.29, p = .022, 95% CI = [−0.223, −0.017], I2 = 
91%; see Fig. S1b in the Supplemental Material). Partici-
pants felt bad when there was a near miss, suggesting 
that they may also have experienced regret when they 
learned that they could have banked if they had pumped 
a little less. In contrast, they felt better when the limit 
was further from the number of pumps they made, sug-
gesting that they experienced relief because they would 
not have won, even if they had pumped a little less. 
These results suggest that emotional responses to infor-
mation after bank and bust trials may be supported by 
similar psychological processes, except that bust trials 
do not strongly elicit regret in comparison with bank 
trials.
Replication Study
One limitation of this study is that although the infor-
mation carried little instrumental utility (as shown in 
our analyses), participants may have erroneously 
believed that information about the balloon’s limit 
could improve their future performance. For example, 
they may have sought to gain a better understanding 
of the distribution of the balloon’s limit. In other words, 
participants may have sought information not because 
they were curious but because they believed that it bore 
some instrumental utility. To address this issue, we 
developed a modified version of the task in which 
participants completed only one critical trial after which 
they could seek information about how much they could 
have won. Because there were no further trials following 
the critical trial, it was extremely clear to participants 
that information seeking in the critical trial could in no 
way help improve their future task performance. In this 
way, we greatly reduced the possibility that participants 
would perceive utility from the information. If informa-
tion seeking in the previous five experiments was largely 
driven by the expected utility of the information, then 
we would at least expect to see reduced information 
seeking. In contrast, if information seeking was not pri-
marily driven by expected utility, then we would expect 
that people would still suffer a cost to seek it despite 
the clear nonutility of the information and its likely 
deleterious effect on mood.
Method
Participants. A total of 361 participants took part in this 
study (199 women; mean age = 34.29 years, SD = 11.97, 
range = 18–77). Only participants who banked on the 
critical trial (n = 216, 59.83%) were given the opportunity 
to seek information about the balloon’s limit. Participants 
were recruited from Prolific (https://prolific.co) and com-
pleted the study online. Participants were paid £1 for 
approximately 10 min of participation. In addition, partici-
pants could earn up to £2.40 bonus on the critical trial. 
The average bonus (for those who banked) was £1.01. 
Those who went bust did not receive a bonus payment.
The sample size was predetermined. On the basis of 
the results of Study 1, we expected to see a medium to 
large effect of counterfactual information seeking on emo-
tion ratings. On the basis of pilot data from 18 partici-
pants, we expected an uneven distribution between those 
who sought and those who did not seek information. We 
used G*Power (Version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buch-
ner, 2007) to determine the sample size required for 
the between-subjects, two-tailed t test with uneven 
groups. We used the following parameters: Cohen’s 
d = 0.5; α = .05; power = 80%; allocation ratio N2/N1 = 
0.25. This gave a minimum sample of 200 participants. 
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In a pilot study, eight out of 18 participants went bust; 
we thus increased our sample by an additional 160 
participants to achieve the required number of partici-
pants who did not go bust. The design and hypotheses 
of Study 2 were preregistered (https://osf.io/yab8q/).
Procedure. The task was based on the one used in 
Study 1. As before, the balloon’s limit on each trial was 
sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and 12. 
The value did not vary but was fixed at 20 pence per 
pump. In the new procedure, participants were given 
instructions explaining the task and completed a practice 
round “to get a feel for how the game works,” which 
consisted of 10 BART trials (as described in the main 
study). They rated their emotion after learning each out-
come on a visual analogue scale with sad and happy face 
anchors (as used in the main study). In these 10 practice 
trials, participants were not given the option to see the 
balloon’s limit. After the 10 practice trials, participants 
received the instructions for the main experiment—that 
there is one last critical round in which they could earn a 
monetary reward (20 pence per pump). They then com-
pleted one critical round of the BART. Because our pri-
mary interest was in bank trials, we decided to offer 
information only to those participants who banked the 
money on the critical trial. If participants went bust on 
this final round, then they did not get a bonus payment, 
and they were not offered the opportunity to see the bal-
loon’s limit. If they banked the money, then after rating 
their emotions about the outcome, they were asked 
whether they wanted to see the balloon’s limit of the 
critical trial. We used waiting time as a cost, as in Experi-
ment 5 of the main study; participants were able to see 
the limit of the balloon if they were willing to wait 30 s 
before receiving a completion code to receive the com-
pensation for the study. Willingness to incur this cost in 
return for information about the balloon’s limit would 
suggest that participants were not simply seeking the 
information to liven up the task, because it would sub-
stantially extend the length of the task with a long and 
boring wait for the completion code.
If they chose to see the information, then they saw 
an animation of the balloon inflating to its randomly 
determined limit and were presented with information 
about how much money they could have won on the 
trial. If they chose not to receive the information, then 
they continued to observe their obtained outcome for 
the same amount of time as if they had chosen to view 
the information so that the delay between the ratings 
was the same whether or not participants sought the 
information. Participants then rated their emotions a 
second time using the visual analogue scale with sad 
and happy face anchors. Note that, unlike in the main 
study, we assessed the current emotion rather than 
directly asking about participants’ “change of emotions” 
and used the change score from the first rating to the 
second rating as the index of regret. This departure 
from the method employed in Study 1 was made to 
address the possibility that asking people to report how 
their emotions had changed would encourage them to 
overestimate change compared with simply reporting 
their emotions twice.
Results
Of the 216 participants who banked on the critical last 
trial, 153 (71%, 95% CI = [64%, 77%]) opted to take a 
30-s time cost to see how much they could have won. 
Participants actually sought information more fre-
quently in this one-shot experiment than in the multi-
trial experiment that also used a time cost (Experiment 
5; 44%, 95% CI = [29%, 60%]). Although an exact statisti-
cal test for the comparison of the proportions between 
Experiment 5 and the replication experiment is difficult 
because of the different trial designs (i.e., in the repli-
cation study, each participant has only one binary 
value), 95% CIs for the rate of information seeking did 
not overlap, suggesting a reliable difference.
Participants who sought information reported sig-
nificantly greater reductions in mood between the emo-
tion ratings (M = −113.03, SE = 10.45) than those who 
did not seek information (M = −20.68, SE = 8.29), 
t(204.74) = −6.93, p < .001, d = −0.81, 95% CI = [−1.11, 
−0.50] (Welch’s t test; for a graphical representation of 
participants’ emotion ratings, see Fig. S4 in the Supple-
mental Material). These results demonstrated that our 
main findings were robust even if it was very clear to 
participants that the information carried no instrumental 
utility.
To better understand the role that information played 
in participants’ mood, we developed a linear model 
predicting participants’ standardized emotion-rating 
change from the interaction between information seek-
ing (effect coded; −1 = information not sought, 1 = 
information sought) and the missed opportunity (mean 
centered) as well as their main effects. This exploratory 
analysis was not preregistered. Again, seeking informa-
tion had a significant negative effect on the second 
emotion rating, b = −0.378, t(212) = −6.28, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [−0.497, −0.259]. There was also a negative effect 
of missed opportunity, b = −0.115, t(212) = −4.74, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [−0.163, −0.067]. However, there was a 
significant interaction between the size of the missed 
opportunity and information seeking, b = −0.121, t(212) = 
−5.01, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.169, −0.074]. Simple-slopes 
analyses revealed that there was no effect of the missed 
opportunity when information was not sought, b = 
0.006, t(212) = 0.16, p = .873, 95% CI = [−0.074, 0.087]. 
In contrast, after participants sought information, the 
larger the missed opportunity observed, the worse 
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participants felt, b = −0.236, t(212) = −8.99, p < .001, 
95% CI = [−0.288, −0.184]. These results again replicated 
our findings in the main experiments and demonstrated 
that our findings were robust to changes in how par-
ticipants’ emotion was measured.
General Discussion
In a set of five experiments using different costs of 
seeking information, participants frequently sought 
information about what they could have won in a 
sequential risk-taking task, despite that information 
having a negative impact on their mood. Reported 
regret caused by information seeking further led par-
ticipants to display more risky behavior in the next trial, 
despite such behavioral adjustment having little or even 
negative performance implications. The results were 
replicated in a large-sample preregistered study even 
when the potential for participants to perceive utility 
of the information was greatly reduced, rendering it 
unlikely that information seeking in earlier experiments 
was driven purely by expected utility. These findings 
demonstrate that counterfactual curiosity, the desire for 
information about what might have been, has a strong 
motivational lure.
Instances of seeking negative information are puz-
zling because they contradict our notion that humans 
are rational decision makers who seek out positive 
emotional experiences and avoid negative ones. It 
seems counterintuitive that people would want to seek 
information that inevitably makes them feel bad. 
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature document-
ing the avoidance of information that might bring bad 
news or disconfirm cherished beliefs (Charpentier, 
Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Hertwig & Engel, 
2016; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). How-
ever, as the current studies demonstrate, there are also 
situations (such as after gambling episodes) in which 
people put themselves at risk of mood reduction simply 
to resolve uncertainty. This kind of information-seeking 
behavior is also part of the fear-of-missing-out (FOMO) 
phenomenon. For example, after deciding which of two 
parties to attend one evening, you might be tempted 
to seek information about the other party by looking 
at social media, even though you are having a good 
time and there is some chance that you will discover 
that the other party was even more fun (Przybylski, 
Murayama, DeHaan, & Gladwell, 2013).
One explanation for seeking negative information is 
that people may also find it interesting to test their 
emotional responses—a mechanism that might also 
underlie so-called morbid curiosity (Oosterwijk, 2017). 
Counterfactual information of the kind sought in the 
current experiments may be desirable because it has 
high personal relevance—it relates to decisions that one 
has made in the recent past (Golman & Loewenstein, 
2018; Murayama, FitzGibbon, & Sakaki, 2019). People’s 
desire for information about their own performance is 
known to be strong enough to overcome cognitive 
biases such as inequality aversion (Alós-Ferrer, García-
Segarra, & Ritschel, 2018). Thus, opportunities to learn 
about oneself and the actual and counterfactual conse-
quences of one’s decisions may have powerful motiva-
tional status.
Future research can test the importance of personal 
relevance by manipulating the feeling of agency that 
the participant has over decisions. Manipulations of 
agency have powerful effects on people’s emotional 
evaluation of events (Coricelli et al., 2005), so it is intui-
tive that a sense of agency would also increase curiosity 
about outcomes and forgone alternatives of the past 
events. Determining how personality traits such as 
intolerance of uncertainty and sensation seeking relate 
to counterfactual curiosity is another important step for 
understanding individual differences in information 
seeking of this kind.
One limitation of the current study is that it is 
unknown whether the observed instances of not seek-
ing information were driven by active avoidance of or 
passive indifference toward the information. Charpen-
tier et al. (2018) devised a method to distinguish these 
motivations by presenting information about investment 
outcomes with .5 probability free of charge. Participants 
could then pay to shift the probability of either receiv-
ing or not receiving information, and in doing so, the 
researchers were able to dissociate active avoidance 
and passive ignorance. Future studies employing a simi-
lar design would elucidate whether choices not to seek 
counterfactual information are instances of avoidance 
or indifference and whether participants differ in the 
extent to which they seek, are indifferent to, or avoid 
information.
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